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Uncertainty, learning, and the “problem” of
dilation
Seamus Bradley and Katie Steele
August 11, 2013
Abstract
Imprecise probabilism – which holds that rational belief/credence is
permissibly represented by a set of probability functions – apparently
suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this
problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strate-
gies: a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, b)
restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that pre-
clude dilation.
1 Introduction
Imprecise probabilism – the view that your belief or credal state is best
represented by a set of probability functions – has received a lot of attention
recently. One important prima facie problem with imprecise probabilism is
dilation. This is a puzzling phenomenon whereby in certain conditions, when
you update on a piece of evidence, your degrees of belief get less precise.
In Section 2, we initially introduce imprecise probabilism and give an ex-
ample of the phenomenon of dilation. Then we give a more formal treatment
of our assumed rule for updating imprecise probabilities. This in turn allows
a clearer understanding of what the phenomenon of dilation is and when it
happens. With these preliminaries in place, Section 3 investigates alterna-
tive belief-updating rules that handle imprecision, and considers desiderata
for an appropriate update rule. The upshot of this discussion is that no
reasonable update rule avoids dilation. Section 4 changes tack: we consider
whether dilation can be avoided by restricting the domain of rational prior
credal states. We discuss why these sorts of restrictions are not convincing,
and go on to conclude that credal states that result in dilation may in fact
be reasonable.
1
2 Imprecise probabilism and dilation
We need some preliminaries before we can properly engage with a discus-
sion of dilation and imprecise probabilism. Not least, we need definitions of
probabilism, imprecise probabilism and dilation.
2.1 Probabilism, precise and imprecise
Orthodox probabilism has your credal state represented by a probability
function, which is a function Pr that maps events, X, to the unit interval,
such that:
• Pr(X) ≥ 0
• If the Xi are mutually exclusive and exhaustive,
∑
Pr(Xi) = 1
We say that Pr(X) is your degree of belief in the event X.
Imprecise probabilism has your credal state represented by a set of such
functions called P . We can then think of P(X) as the set of values assigned
to the proposition X by Pr ∈ P . It can be taken to be a representation of
your unsharp degree of belief in X. There are a number of arguments for
representing belief in this way, not least that it hardly seems a requirement
of rationality that belief be precise (and preferences complete); surely impre-
cise belief (and corresponding incomplete preferences) are at least rationally
permissible.
One important positive motivation for imprecise probabilism is to repre-
sent the difference between the weight of evidence and the balance of evidence
(Joyce, 2005). For example, if you have a coin that you have not tossed at
all, and you have no reason to think heads or tails more likely, but nothing to
rule out arbitrary bias in either direction either, then the balance of evidence
suggests that the coin is as likely as not to land heads. That is, no evidence
pushes in one direction or the other. Now imagine tossing the coin a hundred
times and observing about fifty heads. The evidence is still balanced evenly
between heads and tails, but now there is more weight behind the claim that
it is as likely as not to land heads. The salient precise probabilist response to
both examples is to assign degree of belief 0.5 to the event “the coin will land
heads”. But there seems to be an important difference between the weight of
evidence in these cases. The imprecise probabilist can represent this differ-
ence by assigning [0, 1] to the heads event in the first case and {0.5} in the
second.1
1See also Sturgeon (2008) and Kaplan (2010).
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2.2 Dilation, informally
Imagine you believe that there are a total of 10 black and 10 white marbles
distributed somehow among the urns X and Y . Each urn contains 10 mar-
bles. An urn will be selected at random by flipping a fair coin, and a marble
drawn from it. Using X and Y to refer to the propositions “The marble is
drawn from urn X” and “The marble is drawn from urn Y ” respectively; and
using B and W to stand for the propositions “The marble drawn is black”
and “The marble drawn is white” respectively, the following is a plausible
characteristic of your belief representor,2 P : Pr(B|X) = 1− Pr(B|Y ) for all
Pr ∈ P . As such, before learning, your credences regarding the colour of
the marble drawn are as follows: P(B) = {0.5} = P(W ). You believe that
the number of white marbles and the number of black marbles are equal and
that over the two urns their probabilities average out.
It is surely plausible that your conditional credences are, however, impre-
cise: you have no information about how the marbles are distributed between
the urns, and so it is plausible that you do not rule out the possibility that
urn X contains only white marbles and also the possibility that X contains
no white marbles, and everything in between. Thus your representor P plau-
sibly includes probability functions that represent each of those possibilities.
That is, P(W |X) = P(B|X) = P(W |Y ) = P(B|Y ) = {0, 1
10
, . . . 9
10
, 1}, or, if
convexity were mandated (as per Levi (1974, 1986)), your representor would
plausibly have P(W |X) = [0, 1], and likewise for the other conditional at-
titudes. Whether convexity is mandated when in fact the probability of
drawing white given X could not possibly be, say, 6
21
, is a tricky question
and one we shall ignore. Nothing in our discussion hinges on the sets of
probabilities being convex. For reasons of notational convenience we will
stick to using [0, 1] to represent the aforesaid imprecise conditional beliefs.
So learning which urn is drawn from dilates your probability for white from
{0.5} to [0, 1] and likewise for black. That is, your beliefs in B andW get less
precise, once you learn either X or Y . Note that this analysis of the prob-
lem makes an assumption about what the right belief after learning ought to
be. It assumes that after learning X, say, {Pr(·|X) : Pr ∈ P} is your new
representor.
Note that the standard examples for dilation in the literature involve odd
correlations, such as between the outcome of a coin toss and the truth of some
event for which evidence is lacking (White (2010); Pedersen and Wheeler
(ms); Joyce (2011); Walley (1991)). These cases tend to generate confusion
about proper application of the Principal Principle (see Lewis (1986)); it
is not immediately obvious what is “admissible” and what is “inadmissible”
2The term “representor” is due to van Fraassen (1990).
3
evidence for, say, the coin-toss outcome. Such confusion gets in the way of
intuitions regarding dilation and makes analysis of the phenomenon more
difficult. We prefer the example above because it makes the case for dilation
more straightforward.
Dilation is taken to be a serious problem for imprecise probabilism. Di-
lation seems to lead to violation of prominent epistemic principles like re-
flection; it also looks to have unpalatable decision theoretic consequences;
furthermore it just seems odd that evidence can make beliefs less precise.3
The aim of this paper is to find out how the phenomenon of dilation arises,
and whether it can or should be avoided, at least from the epistemic point
of view (we save the decision-theoretic point of view for another occasion).
2.3 Updating imprecise probabilities
In this section we borrow some formalism from Grove and Halpern (1998)
in order to clarify the standard rule for updating imprecise beliefs, and the
conditions that generate dilation. We have a set of possible worlds S and an
algebra defined on them E . This is the space of possibilities we are consider-
ing: M = 〈S, E〉. There is a set of probability functions defined onM which
we denote ΠM. We think of the process of updating as a function Upd that
takes as input a set of probabilities P and an event, and outputs a set of
probabilities. That is: Upd: 2ΠM × E → 2ΠM .
Recall that P(X) is the set of values assigned to X by elements of P .
The following definitions will be useful:
• P(X) = inf{Pr(X) : Pr ∈ P}
• P(X) = sup{Pr(X) : Pr ∈ P}
• P(X) = {Pr ∈ P : Pr(X) = P(X)}
• P(X) = {Pr ∈ P : Pr(X) = P(X)}
P(X) is the infimum of P(X) and P(X) the supremum. P and P , thought
of as real valued functions, behave like lower and upper probabilities respec-
tively (Walley, 1991; Cozman, nd; Halpern, 2003). Colloquially speaking,
P(X) is the lowest value assigned to X, and P(X) is the set of probability
functions that assign that value to X. Likewise for P and P.
Generalised conditioning is the standard rule for updating sets of proba-
bilities. This is denoted Updcond. Generalised conditioning is characterised
3This consequence also seems to be in conflict with the weight/balance motivation for
imprecise probabilism mentioned earlier.
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as follows:
Updcond(P , E) = {Pr(·|E),Pr ∈ P ,Pr(E) 6= 0} (1)
This is the rule we assumed above, and it is subject to dilation. It is not the
only possible method for updating, but it does seem like the most natural
generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to the imprecise setting.
2.4 Dilation, formally
We say an update rule Upd is subject to dilation for representor P when
there exist X,E ∈ E such that:
Upd(P , E)(X) < P(X) ≤ P(X) < Upd(P , E)(X)
Given an update rule Upd and a representor P , if the above holds, we say E
dilates X.4 Upd(P , E), which, recall, denotes the general updating function,
is a set of probabilities, so it makes sense to think about its extrema. In
short, the above expressions are meaningful.
When is dilation possible? The typical characterisation of dilation found
in e.g. Seidenfeld and Wasserman (1993) and Pedersen and Wheeler (ms) is
in terms of divergence from stochastic independence. This characterisation
assumes that updating works by Updcond. So the following conditions are
not universal. But for a broad class of rules that work in roughly the same
way as Updcond – classical rules (see later) – these conditions are telling.
Define S(X,E) = Pr(X ∩ E)/Pr(X) Pr(E). This can be understood as
a measure of the correlation of X and E. Now define:
• S+(X,E) = {Pr ∈ P , S(X,E) > 1}
• S−(X,E) = {Pr ∈ P , S(X,E) < 1}
S+(X,E) is the set of probability functions in the representor that have X
and E positively correlated. S−(X,E) is the set of probability functions that
have X and E negatively correlated.
A necessary condition for dilation is:
P(X|E) ⊆ S−(X,E) and P(X|E) ⊆ S+(X,E) (2)
If E dilates X, then the above holds. That is, it is necessary for dilation
that the updated lower probability is such that the events in question were
4Throughout the paper it will normally be obvious what rule and representor we are
discussing, and so we do not always make this explicit when describing a case of dilation.
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negatively correlated; and the updated upper probability is such that the
events were positively correlated. Consider the opposite scenario: if the
lower probability for X after learning E were not associated with probability
functions that had X and E negatively correlated, then there would not have
been a decrease in lower probability for X. Likewise for the upper end.
A sufficient condition for dilation is:
P(X) ∩ S−(X,E) 6= ∅ and P(X) ∩ S+(X,E) 6= ∅ (3)
That is, if the above holds, then E dilates X. It is sufficient for dilation
that there is some probability function which has a minimal probability for
X prior to learning and which has X and E negatively correlated; and that
there is some probability function which has a maximal probability for X
prior to learning and has X and E positively correlated. One can see this by
thinking of P as a credal committee.5 Each probability function in P stands
for a committee member with particular opinions. If there are committee
members who think X more unlikely than does anyone else and who also
think E makes X even less likely; and there are committee members who
think X more likely than does anyone else and who also think E makes X
even more likely, then learning E will have the effect of moving the opinions
of those members further apart: dilation.
We later refer to the above conditions – one necessary, the other sufficient
– when we try to find ways to block dilation. The main reason for presenting
these conditions, however, is that they allow a clearer understanding of the
phenomenon of dilation.
Often a distinction is drawn between dilation and strict dilation, which is
when every element Ei of some partition dilates belief in the one proposition
X. Strict dilation is the focus of the literature to date, or more precisely,
special symmetrical cases of strict dilation (like our urns example) are the
focus of the literature. These special cases of dilation are considered troubling
because they apparently raise a conflict for general principles like reflection
that many find intuitively compelling (as we will see in Sections 4.2 and
4.3). But we hold that non-symmetrical cases of strict dilation and standard
dilation are puzzling too. Imprecise probabilities are supposed to allow us to
represent the distinction between weight of evidence and balance of evidence;
a simple reading of this claim would have it that more evidence (greater
weight of evidence) means more precision. Dilation seems to be a case where
more evidence leads to less precision. Therefore, dilation – strict or otherwise
– problematizes this popular line of argument.
5Joyce (2011) attributes this term to Adam Elga.
6
3 Classical update rules
This section investigates whether some plausible alternative to generalised
conditioning may preclude dilation. We restrict our attention to an important
class of update rules known as classical rules6 that have this form:
Upd(P , E) = {Pr(·|E),Pr ∈ P ′,P ′ ⊆ P} (4)
for some suitably chosen P ′. That is, the updated belief is some subset of
the set of conditional probabilities. We do not defend classical updating
rules in this paper; we simply note that classical rules have the best claim
to being natural generalisations of standard Bayesian conditioning, which
serves as our benchmark for updating rules in the precise context. Stan-
dard Bayesian conditioning moves from a prior probability to the relevant
conditional probability. It is natural to think that a set of probabilities is
updated by moving to some set of conditional probabilities. Classical rules
capture this intuition.7 Note that the classical rules are the ones for which
the characterisation of dilation mentioned above is relevant.
The largest such classical rule is generalised conditioning. In the case of
generalised conditioning we take P ′ to be {Pr ∈ P : Pr(E) > 0}. Other
choices for P ′ that also rest on stipulations regarding Pr(E) are:8
1. {Pr ∈ P : Pr(E) = P(E)} (in other words, P)
2. {Pr ∈ P : Pr(E) > τ} for some fixed τ < 1
3. {Pr ∈ P : Pr(E) = 1}
4. ∅
Rules of this form typically have one of two problems: either they suffer from
dilation (the top two); or they are “empty” – i.e. Upd(P , E) = ∅ – when we
would want them not to be (the bottom three).
In any case, the “maximum likelihood” rule (number 1 on the list above)
and its cousins seem to miss the point if the aim is to avoid dilation. There
is no reasonable restriction for P ′ based on Pr(E) such that updating on
E never causes dilation. Consider the marbles-in-urns case again. Dilation
6The terminology is from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993).
7We won’t discuss more radical depatures from the standard Bayesian model, such
as Kyburg’s Evidential Probabilities model (Kyburg and Teng, 2001). Kyburg’s model
doesn’t really have a concept of updating: there is simply the rationally permissible belief
function given a certain body of evidence.
8The first of these is the rule that Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) endorse. The third is
mentioned, but not endorsed by Grove and Halpern (1998).
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occurs whatever the (non-extreme) probability of picking urn X. It is most
striking for Pr(X) = 0.5, but any other value for Pr(X) besides zero or one
also has the same problem.9 So the prior probability of the evidence does
not seem like the right kind of restriction on updating if we are interested in
avoiding dilation. We should, instead, be looking for some restriction that
speaks to our characterisation of dilation in Section 2.
So what we want is some method of selecting a subset of Updcond(P , E)
such that this updated representor is never subject to dilation. Let’s try to
formulate such a classical update rule now. We shall use the shorthand PE
to mean Upd(P , E). What an update rule needs to do to block dilation is
the following: Whenever PE(X) < P(X) and PE(X) > P(X) at least one
of the following two sets of probability functions must be excised from the
posterior representor:
Q = {Pr ∈ P ,Pr(X|E) ∈ [PE(X),P(X)]}
Q = {Pr ∈ P ,Pr(X|E) ∈ [P(X),PE(X)]}
That is, whenever dilation would otherwise occur, the updated representor
should contain no elements of Q or it should contain no elements of Q.
This is the property that a classical rule must satisfy in order to block
dilation. It is a very direct approach. What we are basically saying is “when-
ever the set of probability functions after updating would have resulted in
dilation, you should remove those updated probability functions that yield
the dilation.” This is an extremely ad hoc property; it is a very artificial way
of avoiding dilation.
The dilation-blocker property also has worrying implications. Consider
an example like the one above with marbles in urns, but now let’s say you
know that all the black marbles are in one urn, and all the white marbles in
the other. You just don’t know which is which. That is, your representor
contains just the two endpoints of the representor considered above: the two
functions with Pr(B|X) = 1 and Pr(B|X) = 0. So now learning that the
urn drawn from is X causes your representor to dilate to the two values for
B: Upd(P , X)(B) = {0, 1}. To block dilation, one or the other of these
probability functions must be removed from the representor. In either case,
you become certain of what colour marble will be drawn from the urn. This
is unintuitive, and at odds with the aim of imprecise probabilities, which is
to represent radical uncertainty.
One might argue that this is an artefact of having a non-convex rep-
resentor. If you took a convex cover of the above representor, this would
9The updated belief for B is still [0, 1], whatever value P(X) takes. For values of P(X)
not equal to {0.5}, the prior belief for B is imprecise.
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contain Pr(B|X) = 0.5, and indeed Upd(P , X)(B) = {0.5} seems like the
only plausible classical update that would avoid dilation in this example. We
do not want to enter the debate about whether convexity is mandated.10 We
will, however, point out that the non-convex representor gets something right
about the epistemic state after learning X: it is now determined what colour
the marble will be, even if you don’t know which way it is determined.
Let us nonetheless restrict our attention for the moment to convex repre-
sentors, and reflect further on these marbles-in-urns examples. Take the case
where the probability for “the marble drawn is black” (B) dilates from {0.5}
to [0, 1] according to generalised conditioning. How should an alternative
update rule that avoids dilation deal with this case? As mentioned above,
it seems that the only reasonable possibility is for the updated probability
to remain {0.5}. No other possible update would respect the symmetry of
the situation. But now it seems like you have become convinced that X and
B are probabilistically independent. This is not something you were sure of
before updating.
More generally, avoiding dilation in the urns examples requires that PX(B)
ends up being a subset either of [0, 0.5] or of [0.5, 1]. Therefore, you end up
becoming certain of whether B and X are positively or negatively corre-
lated. Again, this does not seem to be in keeping with the motivation for
imprecise probabilism. In short, removing probability functions from the
updated representor does not seem like a good approach to imprecise up-
dating. Removing functions with Pr(E) = 0 from PE is acceptable, because
those functions are defective – they assigned zero probability to an event that
actually happened. Any other sort of removal does not seem warranted.
Things are in fact worse than this. However we block dilation, one of Q
or Q will be removed. This means that there are Pr ∈ P such that Pr(·|E)
is not in PE for the relevant E. This immediately leads to worries that such
an update rule will violate commutativity : if some other event, F , say, were
learned first, before E, then the aforementioned Pr’s that would be excised
from the representor if E were learned first may well not yield dilation if E is
learned second, and thus not be excised from the final updated representor.
Indeed, any rule that removes some probability functions from the updated
set suggests worries about commutativity. Generalised conditioning respects
commutativity because it only removes those Pr with Pr(E) = 0, namely
those Pr shown to be incompatible with the evidence; these Pr will not
ultimately be live options anyway.
The upshot of this discussion is that, if the domain of prior representors
10Recall from Section 2.2 our ambivalence about whether convexity is mandated. But
see Kyburg and Pittarelli (1992) for discussion of this issue.
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is unrestricted,11 then no classical update rule avoids dilation while also ade-
quately representing the post-update belief state and satisfying the desirable
constraint of commutativity. Given that generalised conditioning does an-
swer to the latter two concerns – it tracks the full extent of uncertainty in the
course of learning and is commutative – we will appeal to this belief update
rule in the remainder of the paper. To reiterate our reasoning: given that
dilation cannot be avoided with an alternative classical update rule, we will
stick with the most popular such rule for updating imprecise beliefs, namely
generalised conditioning. Note that generalised conditioning is axiomatised
by Grove and Halpern (1998), and can also defended by way of a Dutch book
argument (Walley, 1991, Section 6.4).12 So we think it warranted to assume
this particular classical rule in the remainder of the paper.
4 Return of the prior
It might be argued that the problem of dilation lies not in the update rule
but rather in your prior representor. Maybe by appropriately restricting
what sort of priors the update rule should reasonably have to deal with,
we can block dilation. That is, if we could argue that “dilation-vulnerable”
priors were irrational, in any situation, then there would be no problem. In
other words, this section investigates whether there should be a restriction
on what prior representors are permissible, such that all representors that
are vulnerable to dilation are ruled out as impermissible.
In what follows, we examine two proposals to this effect that appear in
some form in the literature. They should be understood as norms of belief
that are more fundamental than the details of the formal representation of
belief. The proposals have much in common, and similar arguments apply
to them. The first proposal (4.2) explores a norm relating to irrelevance
that precludes certain structures i.e., certain relations between beliefs, in
your prior representor. The second proposal (4.3) exploits a version of the
reflection principle to the same effect – certain relations between present and
anticipated future beliefs are ruled out.
In these two sections we consider just whether the proposed norms are
compelling, and whether they serve to rule out the salient dilation-vulnerable
priors in our original marbles-in-urns example. There are serious doubts as
11We return to restrictions on the priors in the next section.
12Recall that classical rules have credence match up, in some sense, with your conditional
beliefs. Walley shows that, if these prior conditional attitudes are what govern your
conditional betting behaviour, then generalised conditioning is the right sort of update
rule to avoid the possibility of a Dutch book being made against you.
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to whether the proposals are plausible at all, and, even if plausible, whether
they do in fact succeed in ruling out the prior representor at issue in our
urns example. In any case, there is a stronger reason for claiming that these
proposals do not serve to block dilation: at best, they only preclude a certain
kind of “symmetrical” dilation. The proposals permit many other cases of
even strict dilation. We discuss this in Section 4.4.
Before we turn to the main content of this section, we would like to clarify
how our project differs from another project, which seeks to rule out cases
of dilation as cases where the formal model misdescribes certain intuitive
features of the set up. This we do in Section 4.1.
4.1 Irrelevance and model-building
The odd thing about dilation in our urns example is that you are learning
something – X, say – that does not discriminate between a black or white
marble being drawn from the urn, and so seems irrelevant to the beliefs it
dilates. That is, learning which urn is drawn from (X or Y ) does not seem
relevant to the colour of the ball drawn from the urn (B or W ). So why
should learning X, say, have such a disastrous effect on your belief in B?
Surely something is amiss here.
In the standard precise setting, irrelevance or independence of X and
B is typically modelled by: Pr(B|X) = Pr(B), Pr(X|B) = Pr(X) or by
Pr(BX) = Pr(B) Pr(X). In this setting these three expressions are equiv-
alent. Call the first epistemic irrelevance of X to B, the second epistemic
irrelevance of B to X, and the third stochastic independence of B and X.
These distinctions are important in the imprecise case since analogues of
these properties are not equivalent. For sets of probabilities Pedersen and
Wheeler (ms) give the analogue of epistemic irrelevance of X to B as:13
1. P(B|X) = P(B) = P(B|¬X)
2. P(B|X) = P(B) = P(B|¬X)
It should be clear that if your representor satisfied this condition, X would
not dilate B. A stronger formal property is that of epistemic independence,
which holds for X and B if and only if X is epistemically irrelevant to B
and B is epistemically irrelevant to X. The imprecise analogue of stochastic
13Note that P(B|X) is a prior conditional belief, not an updated belief. It is the set
of values assigned to B conditional on X by the set of prior probabilities P. That is,
P(B|X) = {Pr(B|X) : Pr ∈ P}. This is extensionally the same as the updated belief in
B after updating on X (assuming generalised conditioning), but we vary the formalism to
highlight the conceptual distinction between updated belief and conditional belief.
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independence is stronger again: X and B are stochastically independent if
and only if, for every Pr ∈ P , we have Pr(BX) = Pr(B) Pr(X); in other
words, when stochastic independence (in the precise sense) holds for every
probability function in your representor.
The question now becomes: is it reasonable to demand that even the
weakest of these notions of irrelevance holds (that is, epistemic irrelevance
of X to B) for the formal model of our marbles-in-urns example? This
property does not hold in our original model of the situation as described in
Section 2.2: we have P(B|X) = 0 but P(B) = 0.5. But perhaps this reflects
the fact that our initial formal rendering of the problem does not capture
the problem at hand, precisely because it does not have X irrelevant to B.
There are two ways we could modify the prior representor in our example to
satisfy this condition. One way would be to make P(B) = 0 and P(B) = 1;
the other, to make P(B|X) = 0.5, and make commensurate changes to the
other conditional probabilities. The first of these is not plausible, since we
are taking P(B) = {0.5} to be non-negotiable: it is fixed by the problem
set-up (via the Principal Principle). So it is implausible to change P(B) and
thus implausible to change P(B).
What about building in epistemic irrelevance by making P(B|X) = 0.5?
Can we find a model of the marbles-in-urns example that is plausible, but is
such that P(B|X) = 0.5? Recall that in the original model P(B|X) = 0. So
relative to the original model, our new model would involve removing some Pr
from our initial description of P . P(B|X) = 0.5 entails that for all Pr ∈ P ,
Pr(B|X) ≥ 0.5; to also have P(B|X) = 0.5 requires that Pr(B|X) ≤ 0.5 for
all Pr ∈ P . Likewise we require that P(B|Y ) = 0.5 = P(B|Y ). So this is
a case where your credal committee is in agreement that it is equally likely
that a marble be drawn from urn X as from urn Y . But this is at odds with
the imprecision in the description of the problem: the whole point of the
example is that you don’t know whether a black marble is more likely from
urn X or urn Y . The reasoning is much the same as in Section 3: remov-
ing probability functions from the updated representor doesn’t do justice to
the imprecision in the problem set-up. So it is not plausible to impose the
epistemic irrelevance of X to B in your prior representor in this way either.
Our original model of the set-up does seem to be the most faithful to the
informal description we gave of it. At the very least, the model described in
Section 2.2 is surely legitimate. Our intuition that X is somehow irrelevant
to B is not borne out by the model. We can reconcile ourselves to this idea as
follows: learning X seems irrelevant to B because it is evidence of unknown
value. It is not that X is not relevant to B, it’s just that you don’t know how
relevant X is to B. There is a real but unknown correlation between B and
X. This is a case of what Pedersen and Wheeler (ms) call proper dilation as
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opposed to improper dilation where the dilation can be mitigated by paying
attention to epistemic irrelevancies among the events.14 So imposing the
epistemic irrelevance of X to B in our example is not justified, at least not
without more of a story. We turn to such a story now.
4.2 An irrelevance norm for belief?
There may yet be something to the intuition that learning X should not
radically alter your belief in B. The way to make this compelling is to
articulate a norm of belief that serves as a clear constraint on rational belief
models. In other words, we seek a plausible norm of belief that effectively
restricts the space of rationally permissible belief representors, such that the
belief representor described in Section 2.2 would be deemed irrational. Some
representors are such that they are vulnerable to dilation: that is, there exist
propositions such that the conditions for dilation described in Section 2.4 are
satisfied. Other representors are not vulnerable to dilation. If there were
some plausible constraint on rational belief representors that would make all
members of the former category impermissible, then dilation could be ruled
out. This is so since no permissible rational belief would be vulnerable to
dilation.15
Drawing inspiration from (Joyce, 2011, p. 302), we propose the following,
which we call the irrelevance norm.16
If it is the case that your belief in some proposition B supposing
X is the same as your belief in B supposing ¬X,17 then it must
also be the case that your unconditional belief in B is the same
as the conditional beliefs.
14Pedersen and Wheeler (ms) explore a number of cases where the initial model is
somehow misdescribed, and once the appropriate redescription is done, certain troubling
instances of dilation disappear. These are the cases of improper dilation; where the initial
model does not take into account certain kinds of irrelevance that should be built into the
model. Our example is not such a case.
15Earlier we implicitly assumed that the domain of the update rule was universal: Upd
was a function on all of 2Π
M
. Now we are considering restricting Upd to some subset
of 2Π
M
. The hope is that there is some plausible restriction that precludes Upd being
vulnerable to dilation.
16Note that Joyce does not offer a norm of belief, but rather a definition of epistemic (or
“evidential” irrelevance) that is based on the pattern of likelihoods across some evidence
partition. Joyce’s definition of irrelevance is different from those discussed by Pedersen and
Wheeler (ms). Our norm amounts to roughly the following restriction: “If X is irrelevant
to B (in Joyce’s sense) then X should be epistemically irrelevant to B (in the sense of
Pedersen and Wheeler)”.
17Of course, beliefs given X and beliefs given ¬X will differ with respect to, say, the
truth of X. But what is required here is that they amount to the same beliefs about B.
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When rendered as a constraint on formal representations of belief, this con-
dition can be read as:
If it is the case that P(B|X) = P(B|¬X) then it must also be
the case that P(B) = P(B|X) = P(B|¬X)
The idea is that if learning X is going to change your belief in B, it shouldn’t
change it in the same way that learning ¬X would.18 The salient imprecise
beliefs in our urns example (Section 2.2) do not conform to the above norm.
We have P(B) = {0.5}, by the Principal Principle. This is non-negotiable.
The conditional beliefs for B, given X and given ¬X (i.e. Y ) are as follows:
P(B|X) = P(B|¬X) = [0, 1]. These conditional beliefs are identical, which
means, according to the irrelevance norm, that belief in B should be the same
as belief in B given X. That is, it should be the case that the aforesaid con-
ditional beliefs are equivalent to the unconditional belief in B, which is {0.5}.
But this is not the case. Overall then, this particular arrangement of beliefs
is illegimate according to the irrelevance norm. Moreover, due to symmetry
considerations and P(B) = {0.5} being non-negotiable, the only plausible
and legitimate beliefs are ones that have P(B|X) = P(B|¬X) = {0.5}.
That is, the rational agent is effectively forced to have precise conditional
attitudes in our urns example, and dilation is thereby precluded.
Of course, the question remains: is the irrelevance norm a reasonable
constraint on rational belief? The imprecise enthusiast would surely object
to restrictions on the domain of permissible prior representors. In the case
of the urns example, the irrelevance norm, coupled with the non-negotiable
instance of the Principal Principle requires you to regard two events such
as B and X as not only epistemically independent, but also stochastically
independent, when the natural way to think of these events is as having un-
known correlation. The points from the previous sections carry some weight
here too. The worry is that this precise model of the urns example doesn’t
do justice to the definite but unknown correlation between B and X.
One may of course conclude that the irrelevance norm is not a reasonable
norm for rational belief. Interestingly, Joyce does not seem to take this route,
but rather emphasises that complementary beliefs are not to be confused
with identical beliefs. Considered as sets of values, P(B|X) and P(B|¬X)
are identical, but what Joyce is arguing is that the credal states they repre-
sent are distinct. When we look more closely, we find that these conditional
beliefs in fact differ, because for each probability function Pr in your repre-
sentor, where Pr(B|X) = p, we see that Pr(B|¬X) = 1− p. So Joyce might
18This is not a mathematical truth, of course, but rather a substantial restriction on
rational belief functions. This is why we describe it as a norm of belief.
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accept the informal version of the irrelevance norm, but deny that the formal
rendering we gave is adequate. Note that this defense effectively highlights
a deficiency in the standard formalism for discussing imprecise belief. Joyce
would say that the irrelevance norm is not violated in our urns example due
to complementarities between the urns: the conditional attitudes upon learn-
ing X or ¬X are not identical, but complementary, so there is no need for
the prior belief in B to be the same.
We can accept the nuanced version of the irrelevance norm (à la Joyce),
or we can reject the norm outright; either way, the prior representor allowing
dilation remains permissible for our urns example. If, on the other hand, we
accept the formal rendering of the irrelevance norm, then dilation is ruled
out, at least for the case considered up until now. We return to whether such
a norm rules out all cases of dilation in Section 4.4.
4.3 A reflection norm for belief?
Reflection is the idea that, if you know that later, your beliefs will be thus
and so, and you consider them rationally justified, then you ought to believe
now what you expect yourself to believe in the future.19 Some consider this
principle to be an appropriate restriction on rational belief, and moreover
argue that the dilating imprecise beliefs in cases like our urns example fall
afoul of the principle (see White (2010), cf. Topey (2012)).
Note that White takes the violation of reflection (a principle that he
clearly holds dear) in examples akin to our urns example to be a refutation
of imprecise probabilism. In effect, White assumes that imprecise probabil-
ism involves a commitment to a universal domain of priors; i.e. imprecise
probabilism is committed to any constellation of imprecise beliefs that fits
the basic structure (sets of probability functions) being permissible. Since
various examples make vivid that, given anticipated future learning, some
constellations of imprecise beliefs violate reflection as stated above, White
concludes that imprecise probabilism must be rejected.
Here we investigate a proposal that is similar to White’s, but which does
not involve a commitment to universal domain for imprecise probabilism. As
per our discussion above, the question is whether there is a plausible restric-
tion on rational belief that may in effect rule out (all) dilation-vulnerable
19This is a limited version of the reflection principle. It applies just to cases where you
know what your beliefs will be in the future, presumably because, whatever the evidence,
you will have the same beliefs. We do not deny that more general versions of reflection
are interesting and may constrain rational belief, but in the context of our discussion, the
limited version of the principle is more pertinent and is already controversial.
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priors. The reflection principle is a plausible candidate for such a principle,
and perhaps more palatable than the above-discussed irrelevance norm.
Consider our urns example, this time in the light of the reflection princi-
ple: assuming that your beliefs are as we described them above, you know
that your belief in B will be [0, 1] after rational updating, since both pos-
sible events you could learn, X and ¬X (Y ), lead to the [0, 1] update via
generalised conditioning. So according to reflection, you ought to believe
that now. That is, your prior belief in B ought to be [0, 1]. But your prior
belief in B is {0.5} (by the Principal Principle). So this constellation of
prior beliefs is illegitimate. Moreover, symmetry considerations coupled with
reflection suggest that the only plausible beliefs one can have here are as
follows: P(B) = P(B|X) = P(B|¬X) = {0.5}.
The reader may well anticipate how the counter-arguments go. Staunch
defenders of imprecise probabilism who are committed to the universal do-
main claim may simply reject the reflection principle. They may claim that
while reflection seems intuitive, it is not in fact a fundamental principle of
rational belief, and cases like our urns example simply demonstrate why re-
flection does not always hold. Otherwise, one could take the Joyce line and
argue that reflection is a legitimate constraint on rational belief, but despite
first appearances, it does not in fact apply to the urns case. The point of con-
tention – as in the last section – is whether the future beliefs are identical. If
the beliefs in B on learning X and on learning ¬X are identical, but different
from the prior belief in B, then reflection rules out this collection of beliefs
as irrational. But the updated beliefs are not identical in this example, even
though they are both represented in summary form as [0, 1]. The updated
beliefs are rather complementary. Or so the argument goes.
As with the case of the irrelevance norm, we think the jury is still out
on this issue of whether, in the context of principles like reflection, imprecise
conditional beliefs of [0, 1] should be regarded as the same belief, regardless
of any complementarities.20 In any case, neither the irrelevance norm nor
reflection will serve to block all dilation-vulnerable priors, even if they block
dilation-vulnerable priors in highly symmetrical cases like the urns example.
We turn to this issue of generality now.
4.4 The search for a general “dilation blocker”
The following example serves to demonstrate why neither an irrelevance-
based norm nor a reflection-based norm is sufficiently general to rule out all
20Topey (2012) offers some interesting reasons why conditional beliefs of [0, 1] should be
treated as identical, and thus why the reflection principle does apply in cases like our urns
example.
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dilation-vulnerable priors. Indeed such norms cannot even rule out all cases
of strict dilation. In short, there are cases of strict dilation (and of course
standard dilation) that are not symmetrical. By symmetrical we mean that
P(X|E) = P(X|¬E). Consider the following case: There are four pos-
sible “states” arising from the product of two independent binary events:
{E,¬E} × {H,T}. Assume that {H,T} is the outcome of a fair coin toss,
so your beliefs are P(H) = P(T ) = {0.5}. Your beliefs about E are inde-
terminate, such that P(E) = [0.1, 0.6] and P(¬E) = [0.4, 0.9]. Define the
event F = {EH,¬ET}. Some calculation reveals that your prior belief in F
is {0.5}. Now let us consider what would happen to your belief in F , were
you to learn H or T . We get P(F |H) = [0.1, 0.6], and P(F |T ) = [0.4, 0.9].21
That is, we have a case of strict dilation for F , given the evidence partition
{H,T}. It is clear, however, that neither the irrelevance norm nor the re-
flection principle can preclude this case of strict dilation, as your conditional
beliefs after learning are obviously not identical. But F dilates H. So even if
we had been successful in blocking some cases of dilation by ruling out some
collections of priors with irrelevance or reflection principles, these principles
wouldn’t speak to this case of dilation.
One may well maintain that the irrelevance norm and the reflection prin-
ciple are compelling restrictions on prior belief functions, and moreover, that
they should be interpreted in a way that actually does restrict the class of
prior representors. This would be to say that these principles are more fun-
damental, as it were, than universal domain, the principle that any set of
probability functions is a legitimate, rationally permissible prior belief. In
our concluding remarks below, we are more sympathetic to the universal do-
main idea. But the point stressed in this section is that no interpretation
of the irrelevance norm or the reflection norm discussed here can serve to
preclude all cases of dilation-vulnerable priors.
A direct way to block all cases of dilation is to propose a principle that
requires prior belief functions do not anywhere satisfy the necessary condi-
tions for dilation. This would be akin to our “dilation-blocker” update rule,
except that on this proposal, the restrictions apply to your prior belief func-
tion; updating would be unproblematic because you would not be permitted
the dilation-vulnerable priors to begin with. Any such principle is hardly
acceptable, however. As per the “dilation-blocker” update rule, the principle
is extremely ad hoc, as it has no independent motivation (unlike irrelevance
or reflection).
21We owe this example of non-symmetric dilation to Teddy Seidenfeld (in correspon-
dence).
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5 Concluding remarks
We have seen that dilation is a problem that plagues many kinds of classi-
cal rules for updating imprecise probabilities. The classical rules that avoid
dilation have other problems, like non-commutativity, or empty update sets.
Indeed, if we want to avoid these sorts of problems then generalised condi-
tioning is the only plausible update rule. But this rule evidently does not
preclude dilation when the domain of prior representors is unrestricted.
The further question is whether an unrestricted domain of prior repre-
sentors is reasonable. Perhaps prior representors that lead to dilation (via
generalised conditioning) are simply irrational. We explored a couple of pro-
posals to this effect – the irrelevance principle and the reflection principle –
but found them to be controversial, and in any case, not sufficiently general
to “block” all cases of dilation.
Let us close with a final suggestion that is admittedly deflationary about
the epistemic puzzle of dilation. The suggestion is simple, and is taken for
granted in some circles, but we trust the journey to this position presented
in this paper is nonetheless worthwhile.22 We suggest that dilation, with
respect to the transition from, say, P(B) to PE(B), is not as epistemically
puzzling as it first appears. It is not puzzling because the conditions for
dilation are already present in your prior representor, before learning. For
instance, it must be the case that the necessary condition for dilation is
fulfilled in your prior conditional credences. The dilation is not a new and
unexpected event that occurs upon learning. It is just a portion of your prior
representor that becomes realised upon learning.23 That is, in the same
way that a suitably reflective agent with precise beliefs can predict her own
updated belief in X on learning E (i.e. Pr(X|E)) for not-yet observed E, a
suitably reflective imprecise agent will see that her credal state will dilate.
The dilation-vulnerable parts of your prior conditional beliefs simply indicate
cases where there is evidence of unknown value to be learned.24
It is also wrong to say that your prior representor P is “precise” and your
posterior representor is “imprecise”. As it happens, P assigns a sharp value to
the events B and W , but other events have imprecise prior belief: consider
22The position we describe here seems to be the consensus view in statistics. Our aim
is to present that view to philosophy.
23Walley (1991) suggests something in this vein as an attempt to reconcile his readers
to dilation.
24Note that this deflationary suggestion about dilation does nothing to rehabilitate the
“weight of evidence” motivation for imprecise probabilism that we mentioned earlier. This
motivation for imprecise probabilism may well be misguided, but note that there are other
motivations that imprecise probabilists can appeal to. See, for instance, Joyce (2011).
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P(BX), for example. What we draw attention to is that your epistemic
situation with respect to B, say, is expressed by your entire belief representor,
or at least some relevant portion of your representor that includes conditional
beliefs about B, and not just P(B) on its own. The complementarities Joyce
draws attention to are a reason to be sceptical that P(B) is an adequate
representation of your belief in B. Moreover, there are other reasons to
think that this representation is deficient: consider your degree of belief that
a coin of unknown bias will land heads. Plausibly, P(H) = [0, 1]. Now,
consider your degree of belief that the coin will land heads ten times in a
row: P(10H) = [0, 1]. Do you have the same attitude to 10H as you do to
H? Surely not! Whatever the real chance of heads, you know that H will
be at least as likely as 10H, and almost certainly strictly more likely. But
again, the sets of probability values amounting to P(H) and P(10H) fail to
reflect this fact.
Once we attend to your full suite of prior beliefs concerning B, there is
no reason to be puzzled about dilation. The change of belief in question was
already written into your prior beliefs. So from the epistemic point of view,
dilation in unconditional belief due to learning is not such a peculiar phe-
nomenon. In fact, the balance of considerations suggest that the imprecise
probabilist is better off, from the purely epistemic point of view, to reconcile
herself with dilation, rather than to opt for some side constraints on impre-
cise priors or update rules that serve to preclude dilation. Of course, the
story does not end there: dilation can lead to somewhat undesirable conse-
quences for sequential decision-making. The decision-theoretic investigation
of dilation, however, must be left for another paper.25
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